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LIBERATION FROM THE SOVIET PAST: A REFLECTION ON THE
POSSIBILITY OF POST-GULAG THEOLOGIES1
by Mikhail Sergeev
Mikhail Sergeev recently completed his doctorate in Russian religious
philosophy at Temple University in Philadelphia and now teaches
history of religions plus modern art and literature at the University of
the Arts in Philadelphia.
Introduction
The notion of "liberation theology" when applied to Russia and Russian
experience in the 20th century has quite a specific connotation. In the so-called "third
world" countries, liberation theology represents a broad ideological and social
movement the goal of which is to struggle against different forms of oppression.
Thus, liberation theologians fight against the oppressive influence of national and,
most importantly, international or global capitalist networks. In this respect the
experiment of Soviet Russia is unique, for it embodied one form of ideological
opposition to the spread and globalization of the capitalist system as well. In fact, it
was an opposition which managed to become a real threat to capitalism and survived
more than seventy years of social practice.
In contrast to liberation theology, the Soviet ideology was essentially antireligious and aimed at achieving the ultimate "liberation," namely, the freedom from
God. Accordingly, it was based on a series of dogmas which pretended to
scientifically explain and control life in its totality. As a result, the "death of God" led
to spiritual degradation of the people, while plans for total regulation brought the
country into chaos and absurdity.
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A short version of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of the Mid-Atlantic
Region of the American Academy of Religion (AAR) in March 1997 in Wilmington, Delaware, and at
the Eastern International Region of the AAR in April 1997 in Buffalo, New York.
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In August 1991 the Soviet Union finally disappeared as a political entity from
the world map. Yet it continues a phantom existence in the minds of its former
citizens. A difficult task which Russia faces in this post-Soviet phase of its history is
the inner liberation from the clinging shadows of the still recent Soviet past. Russians
cannot go on as if the horrors of the Gulag never happened. To this nation, once again
at the crossroads of history, there is a deep need to understand and redeem the
genocide against its own people, which took tens of millions of lives in less than a
century. Post-Gulag liberation theology which comes out of facing the problem may
well set the nation on a new course. The question is whether this liberation from the
Soviet experience will bring with it integration into the international community or
whether it will preserve and even reinforce 20th century Russian opposition to global
capitalism.

The Orthodox Church Under Soviet Rule
The collapse of the Soviet Union, among other things, manifested the
impossibility of the communist ideology continuing to cement the edifice of the
immense atheist empire. The corrosion of communist doctrine appeared complete and
irrevocable. It was natural, then, to suppose that Russia would return to its traditional
and main confession, Orthodox Christianity. It has to be said, however, that the
Russian Orthodox Church itself in the course of the twentieth century has gone
through significant transformations.2

2

Two books summarize the history of the Russian Orthodox Church in the 20th century. The
first, A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy, written by Nathaniel
Davis (Westview Press: Boulder, 1995), is a secular investigation of Russian Church history since the
communist revolution of 1917. The second by a Canadian historian of Russian descent, an Orthodox
Christian himself, Dimitry Pospielovsky available in English since 1984, was recently translated and
published in Russian as Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov' v XX veke. Moscow: Respublika, 1995. Both
works include data from the archives on the history of the Church which was kept secret during Soviet
times.
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In the beginning of the century the Russian Orthodox Church which since the
times of Peter the Great was held under strict state control, made an effort at renewal
and separation from secular authorities. The movement to achieve this autonomy,
however, was not crowned with success.3 On the contrary, the First World War, the
collapse of monarchical rule in Russia, and the October revolution of 1917 and the
civil war that followed, brought the unreformed Orthodox Church into a crisis of truly
Biblical proportions.
The fundamental problem which faced Orthodox leaders then was their
relationship to the newly created and openly atheistic Soviet state. The Church
Council (Pomestnyi Sobor) of 1917-1918, which re-established the Patriarchal
Church government and elected its first Patriarch, Tikhon, was not even able to
complete its work because of the repression against the Church. To the movement for
its revitalization the Bolsheviks responded by nationalizing the Church's land,
buildings and institutions of learning, and by demoralizing Orthodox believers with
the militant atheist propaganda.
In the face of the growing tension between the Orthodox Church and the
emerging atheist state, the decisions of the Council were aimed at "political
neutrality" toward secular authorities. Through the urging of the Patriarch, the Church
did not take sides with either the "reds" or the "whites," but appealed to both camps to
repent and stop the bloody civil war. The Soviet government in its turn increased its
attacks on the Church. As the Canadian historian, Dimitry Pospielovsky, writes in his
book, The Russian Orthodox Church in the 20th Century:
During the years 1918-1920 at least twenty-eight bishops were
murdered, thousands of priests were either put into prisons or
murdered as well; and the number of lay people who paid with their
lives for the defense of the Church interests or simply for their faith,
according to available sources, comprised twelve thousand.4
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For an elaborate discussion of the movement toward Church renewal see, James W.
Cunningham, A Vanquished Hope. The Movement for Church Renewal in Russia, 1905-1906.
Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1981.
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Pospielovsky, Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov', p.54. Here and later--unless otherwise stated-translations from the Russian are made by the author of the paper.
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When it became clear to the rulers that in spite of all repression the popularity
and influence of the Church among Russians had not decreased, they attempted to
split it from within. For this purpose the Soviet leaders supported the alternative
reform movement, obnovlenchestvo, which might easily have destroyed the
Patriarchal Church in these troubled times. The members of obnovlenchestvo
expressed their backing of the regime and glorified the socialist idea as the
manifestation of social justice. At the same time they accused the Patriarch of taking
a reactionary stand and they created a network of alternative and independent
parishes.
Confronted with the internal conflicts and the worsened relations with the
authorities, and blackmailed by open threats to exterminate the Church, the next
Patriarch, Sergii, in 1927 was practically forced to follow the example of
obnovlenchestvo and to make a declaration of loyalty to the Soviet regime. However,
even this highly unpopular, collaborationist measure did not save the Orthodox
Church from new waves of repressions. The thirties brought the culmination of the
anti-religious terror aimed at "a massive liquidation of all religious institutions...
almost achieved" by 1939.5 In the same years the "number of priests [serving] in the
original territory of the Soviet Union decreased by 95%" as well.6
The Orthodox Church might well have been completely destroyed if the
Second World War had not begun. In the face of Hitler's invasion and the confusion
in the Soviet leadership, the repressed Church immediately raised its voice appealing
to Russian patriotic feelings. By 1943, at the peak of the war, Stalin made a decision
to formally reestablish the Church under the total control of the Party. In the post-war
years the legalized Church was allowed to perform its ecclesiastical functions and
even to grow administratively. In exchange for its survival, the Church played the

5

Ibid., 164.

6

Ibid., p.169.

4

humiliating role of dependent, puppet-like institution, a "living symbol" of the
fictitious religious freedom in the USSR.7
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The situation of the Russian Orthodox Church was quite ambiguous then, as well as in the
60s and 70s. See, for example, an article by Michael Bourdeaux, "The Russian Church, Religious
Liberty and the World Council of Churches" published in the journal Religion, State and Society
(formerly Religion in Communist Lands), Vol. 13, No.1, Spring 1985, which discusses the issue of
religious freedom in the light of the relations between the ROC and the World Council of Churches.

5

During the early 60s, in the Krushchev era, the Orthodox Church suffered
another wave of repression. It turned out to be, however, the last major attempt of the
communist rulers to overthrow Orthodox religion and to prevent its apparently
coming resurrection. Already in the late 60s-early 70s the mood for Christian
Orthodox revival was in the air. The changes began from within the Church itself.8
One aspect of the new movement was connected with religious freedom and
ecumenism. Another indication of the growing influence of Orthodoxy was the
revived interest in pre-revolutionary culture and national roots in general.
The alliance of religion and nationalism, although potentially dangerous,
seemed natural in light of the long suppression of national cultures in all of the Soviet
Republics for the sake of an artificial "proletarian internationalism." In Russia the
religious agitation reached its acme, perhaps, in 1988 with the celebration of a
thousand years of Christianity in the country. The Soviet regime was at that time
already in its death-agony. Only three years later, after its final collapse, the Orthodox
Church found itself facing the new challenge of leading a Russian national revival
after seventy years of Communist rule.

Heritage of the Emigration
While the Orthodox Church was preoccupied simply with its survival and
remained in a morally vulnerable position in Soviet Russia, those Orthodox believers
who were either exiled from the country or managed to emigrate, observed the
unfolding of Russia's tragedy from outside. The representatives of this first wave of
spiritual emigration formed the Russian Orthodox Church in Exile and created a
series of oppositional journals and publishing enterprises. The most important,
perhaps, were the religious-philosophical journal Put' (The Way) and the YMCA
Press Publishing House, both headed by the famous Russian emigre philosopher,
Nikolai Berdiaev.
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More on this in: Fr. Michael Aksionov Meerson, "The Russian Orthodox Church 19651980," Religion, State and Society, Vol. 9, Nos. 3-4, Autumn 1981.
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The task which stood before the authors of this free Orthodox press was to
comprehend -- using the title of one of Berdiaev's book -- The Origin and Meaning of
Russian Communism, and based on that analysis to forecast the future of Russia.
Russian communism was understood by these religious thinkers not just as a social or
political disaster, but rather, as a national spiritual catastrophe, an internal disease
which spread to other nations. As believers they also argued that God gave power to
communists for the purpose of punishing Russia and the whole world for its sins. In
order to recover from communism Russia thus had to repent and to renew the
foundations of national life.
This position was most consistently formulated, perhaps, in Nikolai Berdiaev's
book about communism. Berdiaev develops here his general thesis about communism
being a pseudo-religion, a national curse which may be overcome only by intense
spiritual healing from the inside. Communism, he writes, "wants to be the religion
which comes to replace Christianity; it pretends to respond to the religious quest of
the human soul, to provide the meaning of life."9 In an earlier essay, "Meditation on
the Russian Revolution," Berdiaev adds that "Bolshevism was a perverted, turnedinside-out realization of the Russian idea."10 He notes also what, in his opinion,
constitutes a remarkable aspect of the "Russian idea." He says that "a Russian
religious person understands that in the face of God the European bourgeois is not
better than the Russian communist."11

9

Nikolai Berdiaev. Istoki i smysl russkogo kommunizma [Origin and Meaning of Russian
Communism]. [Reprint copy of the 1955 edition by YMCA Press]. Moscow: "Nauka," 1990, p.129.
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Nikolai Berdiaev. "Razmyshleniia o russkoi revolutsii." Novoe srednevekov'e. Razmyshlenie
o sud'be rossii i evropy [The New Middle Ages. Meditation on the Destiny of Russia and Europe].
Moscow: Phoenix--KhDS-Press, 1991, p.38.
11
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This controversial statement displays Berdiaev's deep conviction that the
future liberation of his motherland from communism has little to do with Russia
embracing the ideal of capitalist democracy. Berdiaev defends this position which, we
should mention in passing, was quite common in the Russian emigre circles, by going
to the extreme. He is not only criticizing Western-style democratic societies, but
attacks the very idea of democracy and dissociates it from the religious ground of
human existence.
His argumentation is twofold. First, Berdiaev argues, democracy as a rule of
the majority has a formal character, ignores the very content of the people's will, and,
therefore, is indifferent to truth. By idolizing the collective will of a nation and
trusting only a mechanical counting of votes, contemporary democracy "is tolerant
because it is indifferent, because it has lost faith in truth, is impotent to choose
truth."12 Second, it represents a secular organization of social life while all societies
established on sacred principles, on the contrary, have not been democratic. This
mutual repulsion of democratic and sacred principles is natural because, as Berdiaev
points out, "Truth is sacred and society which is based on truth cannot be an
exclusively secular society."13
The recognition of a religious dimension in communism and the need for a
Russian spiritual revival which will exclude the establishment of a secular democracy
was expressed in different and less absolutist forms by many of Berdiaev's
colleagues. A Russian emigre philosopher and political leader, Ivan Il'in, for example,
who did not reject democracy in general, thought nevertheless that in Russia's 20th
century case this form of government is categorically contra-indicated. "Democracy
may be appropriate, expedient and politically justified in some states," he wrote, "and
may be completely unfit, really fatal, in others." And when considering the future of

12

Nikolai Berdiaev. "Demokratiia, sotsialism i teokratiia" ["Democracy, Socialism and
Theocracy"]. Novoe srednevekov'e, p.63.
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post-communist Russia Il'in, a monarchist, reasonably asked his readers: wouldn't it
be "madness and betrayal to demand [then] a 'democratic republic' in Russia?!"14

14

Ivan Il'in Nashi zadachi: istoricheskaia sud'ba i buduschee rossii [Our Tasks: Historical
Fate and Future of Russia]. Moscow: MP "Rarog," 1992, Vol.I, p.270.
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The powerful voice of those emigrants who opposed the democratic choice for
Russia was moderated by a second camp of adherents to democratic ideals. Nikolai
Losskii, for example, was among these rare Russian thinkers who not only supported
democracy, but tied this support to his religious-philosophical views. Losskii was a
defender of organic philosophy which presupposes the monarchical order of the
world. He thought that the world as a system united by the Cosmic Substance,
Sophia, is composed of the infinite multitude of sub-systems governed by other
substances. Thus, a nation, for instance, is united and moved by the nation's soul.
This ontological monarchism, as Losskii noted, however, has little to do with
monarchism as a political system. The authoritarian monarch does not express the
soul of the nation any better than the democratically elected president. On the
contrary, in the course of the growing complexity of social life, the unity of the state
is achieved more securely by the dispersion of power and by a constitutional
limitation of the absolute power of the monarch. Finally, neither monarchy nor
democracy, in Losskii's opinion, is unconditionally perfect. In some circumstances
the latter is preferable; under other conditions people should embrace the former. The
choice depends upon what system of government can best balance the united will of
the nation with the rights and development of its members.15
A stronger and more uncompromising case for democracy in the Orthodox
Christian context was made by Georgii Fedotov in his article "Foundations of
Christian Democracy." The importance of Fedotov's approach consists of analyzing
the idea or substance of democracy which he derives, not from the Ancient Greek or
Roman civilizations, but from the heritage of the Old Testament.
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Nikolai Losskii elaborates on these issues in his articles "Organicheskoe stroenie obschestva
i demokratiia" ["Organic Structure of Society and Democracy"], Sovremennye Zapiski, 1925, Vol. 25;
"V zaschitu demokratii" ["In Defense of Democracy"], 1926, Vol. 27.
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Thus, he contrasts monarchy as the hereditary power described in the Book of
Kings to the power of charismatic popular leaders depicted in the Book of Judges. The
informal authority of the Judges constitutes, in Fedotov's view, the root of popular
religious democracy, for he thinks that the "meaning and vocation of democracy
[consists of] liberation of a personal charisma of power."16 A true Christian
democracy, hence, brings with it the spirit of sobornost' or religious counciliarity
when the "whole nation (Israel) and each citizen--the carrier of the kingdomly
priesthood--and the leaders promoted by the people" become the vehicle for the
disclosure of this charisma.17

After Communism: Christian Democracy
The fall of the Soviet Empire came unexpectedly for the Russian Orthodox
Church, which was still too weakened and distrusted by its collaboration with
communists to immediately fill the social and ideological gaps appearing in the
Soviet ruins.18 As the beginning of the 90s showed, the heritage of the Orthodox
thought in emigration, definitely anti-communist but often anti-democratic as well,
also did not prove a tremendous help in building a successful Christian democratic
movement in post-Soviet Russia.

16

Georgii Fedotov "Osnovy khristianskoi demokratii" ["Foundations of Christian
Democracy"] Polnoe sobranie statei [Full Collection of Articles]. Vol.III Paris: YMCA-Press, p.139.
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Ibid., p.140.
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For a discussion of the Church attitude toward the coup of 1991 which preceded the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, see: Yevgenii Polyakov "The Activities of the Moscow Patriarchate
during 1991" in Religion, State and Society, Vol.22, No.2, 1994, pp.145-163.
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While the Orthodox Church officially dissociated itself from any political
orientation, there appeared many parties which used Christian ideals in their political
programs to rebuild Russian civil society. One of the most significant among such
groups was the Russian Christian Democratic Movement established in April 1990.
At first this movement seemed to have the highest potential in the horizon of Russian
politics for its intention to combine the elements of Christianity, democracy and
nationalism into one unified ideological platform. In the course of its evolution,
however, the nationalistic-patriotic drive outweighed the other two aspects of the
program. As a result, the movement suffered from serious splits and gradually moved
to the periphery of Russian political life.19 This metamorphosis from Christian
democracy to state patriotism was not accidental and most certainly was dictated by
the general logic of post-communist politics in Russia. It is characteristic that none of
the other Christian Democratic parties were able to get to the top of the Russian
political arena either.
This general failure of Christian democracy in post-Soviet Russia may be
attributed to different social and political factors. But a crucial role, in my view, was
played by the absence of a well-developed ideology which would interpret the Soviet
experience from a Christian perspective and at the same time unite people on the
basis of Orthodox democratic values. The lack of such an ideological system is also
recognized by some of the Christian democratic leaders.

19

For more information on the establishment of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement
see two articles by Richard Sakwa, "Christian Democracy in Russia" and "Christian Democracy and
Civil Society in Russia," published in Religion, State and Society, Vol.20, No.2, 1992, pp.135-201
(with a documentary appendix), and Vol.22, No.3, 1994, pp.273-305.
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One of the founders of an association called A Christian Alternative to
Russian Fascism, Sergei Lezov, in his article, "The National Idea and Christianity"
examines the perspectives of future post-Gulag theology in the light of the rethinking
of Western Christian identity after Auschwitz: "Our century will go down in history,"
he writes, "as the age of the gulag and of Auschwitz,"20 and he proposes to learn from
the Western theological attempts to reshape post-war Christianity. Lezov himself sees
this lesson in the "post-Auschwitz theology" which most importantly "has renounced
any dependence on national values and traditions [and] has relativized its own claim
to be privy to absolute truth."21 Orthodoxy, he argues, is in similar urgent need of an
understanding arising from reflections on why in 1917 the country was Anot saved by
churches where services were taking place,@ in other words to understand why
Russian Orthodoxy was bankrupt in the face of Bolshevism, why the Russian
Orthodox Church was not equal to the challenge of taking on the spiritual leadership
of the nation.22
Lezov's thesis is echoed by another contemporary Orthodox thinker, Fr.
Veniamin Novik. "The most important question (Russia) faces today," he writes in an
article "Russia--Between Past and Future," "is the question of how the Russian
catastrophe of this century was possible."23 The author evidently grasps the depth of
this question, but remains silent about the answer. As Alexander Shchipkov points out
in his short essay on the social implications of Christian teaching, the Orthodox
Church
has worked out no social doctrines, and our Christian Democrats
therefore have nothing to build on. Nobody in Russia has made any
20

Sergei Lezov "The National Idea and Christianity" [This article first appeared in Russian
under the title "Natsional'naia ideia i khristianstvo" in the journal Oktiabr' no.10 (1990), pp.148-160],
Religion, State and Society, Vol.20, No.1 (1992), p.29.
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Ibid., p.39.
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Fr. Veniamin Novik. "Russia--Between Past and Future" [This article "Rossiia - mezhdu
proshlym i budushchim" appeared in Russian in Stolitsa, no.46-47, 1991, pp.72-75.] (Trans. Kathy
Carter). Religion, State and Society, Vol.22, No.2 (1994), pp.183, 188.
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real attempt to provide a theological justification for Christian
politics.24
Conservative Trend in Orthodoxy
While the pro-democratic forces in the Orthodox world are still looking for a
viable synthesis of the post-communist "Russian idea" with contemporary forms of
Christianity, the opposing conservative camp seems already to have formulated its
version of post-Gulag Orthodox Christian theology. The author of this ideological
approach was Metropolitan Ioann, now deceased.

24

Aleksandr Shchipkov. "Some Observations on Orthodoxy and Christian Democracy."
(Trans. Emma Watkins). Religion, State and Society. Vol.22, No.3 (1994), p.306.
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Metropolitan Ioann developed his views in a series of books and in interviews
published by the newspaper Sovetskaia Rossiia (Soviet Russia), a remarkable symbol
of the post-Soviet alliance between neo-communist and conservative-patriotic
Orthodox circles. As the Metropolitan's press-secretary, Konstantin Dushenov,
pointed out in an article which appeared in Sovetskaia Rossiia in memory of the
deceased Church hierarch, the Metropolitan became a bond which linked
contemporary Russia to its centuries-old historical and religious tradition (by having
been able to) formulate an integral, detailed and historically justified ideology of
Russian national-religious revival.25
According to Metropolitan Ioann's doctrine, the religious revival in Russia
must begin with a clear understanding that Soviet atheism was a diabolic temptation
imposed upon Holy Russia by the degradating West. Russia paid a horrible price for
overcoming this intellectual and spiritual infection originated by a secular Western
Jew, Karl Marx. However, communism is just one in a series of measures taken by
the leaders who act behind the scenes to destroy Russia and Orthodox spirituality.
Another step in the same direction is made by these "plotters" through the
implantation of the foreign democratic political system into Russian soil. In the
Metropolitan's opinion, the future national revival of Russia will have nothing to do
with democracy, which leads but to the degradation of morals and the demolition of
traditional Russian statehood. Konstantin Dushenov reaffirms this question of
principle in another article "A Not-Complicated Truth" in which he analyzes the
ideological "antagonism of Orthodoxy and democracy."26
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Konstantin Dushenov. "Prorok" ["The Prophet"]. Sovietskaia Rossiia, No.50, April 30,

1996.
26

This "not complicated truth," according to Dushenov, consists of a simple fact that the
"democrat is the enemy of the Church." See: Konstantin Dushenov, "A Not Complicated Truth,"
Sovetskaia Rossiia, No.56, May 18, 1996.
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However, neither the Soviet, nor even the recent democratic form of the trap
uncover the true source of the anti-Russian conspiracy, teaches the Metropolitan
Ioann. In the heart of the struggle lies an irreconcilable difference between two
religions, Judaism and true (Orthodox) Christianity. "The spiritual principles of both
sides," the Metropolitan writes, "are completely opposite and antagonistic...From the
Christian perspective Judaism has no positive religious content," he continues,
because since the rejection of Jesus by the Jews, a "militant anti-Christianity becomes
the foundation of Judaism."
The opposition between Judaism and Christianity can be directly applied to
the relationship between two peoples, the Jews and the Russians, both of which are
characterized by a clear messianism. However, as the Metropolitan develops his
thesis, this national chosenness is different:
[An] Orthodox understanding of its chosenness is the
understanding of its responsibility to serve its neighbor. A chosenness
of a Jew is chosenness to dominate over the surrounding people.27
After such openly anti-Semitic statements the Metropolitan warns his readers
about the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" and the "global Masonic conspiracy"...
It is remarkable that this highly controversial, national-messianic religious
thought at present compromises with a revived communism. Neo-communists simply
ally with any movement which would enable them to regain mass popularity.
Orthodox Christianity appears an ideal partner for such a strategy, and the neocommunist leader, Gennadii Ziuganov, made rhetorical appeals to the Orthodox
people and quoted the Church Fathers in his recent campaign speeches.28
Conservative Orthodox Christians, in their turn, declare that they are against
communism of any sort, but will make a temporary alliance with neo-communists to
further the sacred goal of national salvation and revival. However, there is a deeper
27

The Metropolitan Ioann. "Tvortsy kataklizmov" ["Creators of Cataclisms"]. Sovetskaia
Rossiia, No.32, March 22, 1994.
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See, for example, an article by Vladimir Iliushenko "Kakaya tserkov' nuzhna Ziuganovu?"
["What Church Does Ziuganov Need?"]. Literaturnaia Gazeta, No.23, June 5, 1996.
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common ground, in my view, between the two programs. A purely atheistic
communism and an Orthodox religious nationalism share a mutual thirst for an enemy
and an appeal to national-messianic consciousness. The distinction is that while
communism struggles against the international bourgeoisie and builds an earthly
paradise for its followers, Orthodox nationalism opposes the global community and
promises a reward in heaven for the believers.
Conclusions
It is often assumed that the main danger of communist doctrine consists of its
atheism. When purified of an anti-religious drive, some say, it still retains the
advantages of its social teaching. Others, on the contrary, insist that the socialist
project itself failed, as compared to the capitalist democratic systems. As I see the
problem, however, the substance of the Soviet experience lies neither in the social
sphere, nor even in the domain of religion, but first of all in the spirit of disunity and
war which prevailed in the communist countries, as opposed to the spirit of
integration and peace.
This spirit of disunity may appear under the slogan of socialism and
democracy, under atheism as well as religion. To overcome the Soviet past for
Russia, therefore, would mean, in my view, not just to formally switch from one to
the other, but to break away from the tradition of enmity toward the rest of the world.
A development of a post-Gulag theology, faithful to the Christian spirit of love,
accordingly, will help in and mark the accomplishment of such a liberation.
The years which have passed since the fall of the Soviet Empire have
demonstrated that this will not be an easy task. Both Christian camps considered in
this paper, namely, those who believe in a Western-style democracy and those who
ardently deny the West, are apparently stuck within countless divisions and lack a
unifying principle. It may well happen that a belief in the salvific power of the
Christian religion and democratic values is just a dogmatic prejudice itself. In this
case a true future post-Gulag theology will be neither Christian, nor democratic. At
any rate, the country is in desperate need of a new identity. The identity crisis in
contemporary post-communist Russia is so pressing that President Yeltsin recently
17

appealed to his aides and to the Russian people to search for a new ideology. The next
ten to twenty years will show what course post-Soviet Russia will have finally taken.
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